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Abstract. Applications for developed Supervisory Control And Data Acquisi-
tion (SCADA) protocols in several domains, particularly the energy sector, must
satisfy hard real-time constraints to ensure the safety of the systems they are
deployed on. These systems are highly sensitive to Quality of Service (QoS) vio-
lations, but it is not always clear whether a compliant implementation will satisfy
the stated QoS in the standard. This paper proposes a framework for studying
a protocol’s QoS properties based on a queuing network approach that offers a
number of advantages over state machine or model-checking approaches.
The authors describe the framework as an instance of a network of M/M/1/K of
queues with the block-after-service discipline to allow for the analysis of proba-
bilistic packet flows in valid protocol runs. This framework allows for the study
of denial of service (DoS), performance degradation, and de-synchronisation at-
tacks. The model is validated by a tool allowing automation of queue network
analysis and is used to demonstrate a possible breach of the QoS guarantees of
the ISO/IEC 61850-7-2 substation automation standard with a de-synchronisation
attack.
Keywords: Queue Networks, ISO/IEC 61850, Quality of Service, Protocol Anal-
ysis, De-synchronisation Attack
1 Introduction
The methods that are used to secure SCADA technologies are being stretched due to
their incorporation into Smart Grid (SG) communication standards. To maintain the
safety of the physical distribution infrastructure, stringent QoS requirements that gov-
ern how instructions and data are transmitted and processed across the network must
be maintained by the implementer of the SG’s communications network. Any delays in
transmission could potentially lead to the disruption and damage of the physical distri-
bution network. The imbalance of maintaining the QoS requirements over the security
promises laid out in the communications standards in a SG cyber-physical system could
lead to the safety of physical infrastructure still being compromised. This is due to mali-
cious actors being able to force the communications network into either an undesirable
state, or being allowed to send malicious commands. Whilst both the academic and
industrial research communities are now focusing on solving these new security chal-
lenges posed by SG technologies, there is very little focus dedicated to checking if the
security and QoS promises made by SCADA protocols hold true. It is important that the
communications standards have rigid security definitions as the networks they will be
deployed on will be made up of devices supplied by different manufactures, who may
have different interpretations of the standard, as well as the infrastructure itself being
required to run uninterrupted on a time scale of decades. Alongside this the commu-
nications network will be distributed across a wide area network, which provides an
adversary with ample attack vectors to undermine the security of the cyber infrastruc-
ture. A benefit of securing the protocols is that it could prevent some of the attacks that
have already been implemented against SG technologies using these standards[2].
The focus of this work is to describe and demonstrate the effectiveness of a frame-
work developed by the authors to analyse distributed communications models that are
being incorperated into SCADA standards. The authors have pursued a new framework
because the standards that govern communications networks provide a large number of
communications models, whose permutations of use would make the searchable space
of potential attacks close to boundless[13]. Also SG standards are more flexible on the
acceptable behaviour within a communication models than their cryptographic counter-
parts, so traditional model checking frameworks would find it difficult to detect unde-
sirable behaviours in their communications models.
The framework uses queuing networks to model the flow of both regular and malicious
packets between the stages of the state machine representing a possible protocol run.
The model can analyse how an adversary interacts with the semantic steps of either the
client or server machines in a run that involves, theoretically, as many communication
models as the user of the framework needs, in attempt to drive it into a undesirable state.
Each queue in the network is truncated to allow for a more realistic modelling of buffer
sizes of the state machine, so that packets can be prevented from travelling through the
network if all of its recipient queues are full. This inclusion allows DoS attacks against
a run to be encapsulated in any model computed by the framework. The framework
also allows the user to model attacks against the semantics of synchronization of state
machines in a protocol run. In its current form the framework provides a global view
of the run, showing the user the mean total number of packets in each stage of the run.
The mean total number of packets can be used to derive a range of performance metrics
that allow the user analyse the affects that an attack will have on a specific part of the
protocol run. The framework can also be reconfigured to look at attacks at the packet
level of the network.
The author’s are primarily using the framework to investigate the promiseses of IEC
61850 substation automation standard, which has stringent QoS requirements governing
communications network. These stringent requirments provide a fertile development
ground for the discovery of bespoke attacks that only arise in networks with distributed
communication topologies. As well as this, the generation of any potential solutions for
these undesired behaviours must be efficient enough meet the QoS of the protocol. The
real-time nature of the protocol means that the communications networks of the SG are
easily susceptible performance degradation and attacks against the security promise of
availability. However, the way in which framework has been developed means that any
attacks discovered, and their potnetial solutions, can be applied to other SCADA and
distributed communications standards. Using the framework the authors have discov-
ered an attack against IEC 61850’s control communication model[12]. In this attack the
adversary alters the rate of processing of one of the queues in the protocol run, which
increases the probability that the server’s state machine will go down the timeout path
of the run. As the server’s state machine doesn’t announce that it has timed out, the
client continues sending request for the server to follow. This will eventually lead to a
de-synchronisation of state between the client and server, and will force both machines
to reset the run.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the current re-
search on how DoS and timing attacks affect SGs, along with how queuing theory has
been used to model DoS attacks. Section 3 goes onto to describe the mathematical for-
malism used in the framework. Then section 4 describes the de-synchronisation attack
demonstrated by in framework. Before giving a conclusions and a direction for future
work in section 5.
2 Related Works
Many different frameworks have been developed over the years to model the security
promises of cryptograpic standards. The underlying principle of each varies; the main
ones being belief logics, theorem proving and state exploration, along with an array of
different model checkers[17].
The main use of the queing theory formalism in the security domain has been to de-
scribe DoS attacks. It is a suitable formalism for this type of attack, as DoS scenarios
can be modeled without much abstraction. This is due to how queuing theory calculates
the efficency of a series of objects being processed in a queue according to a specific
set of rules. These rules can easily be translated to represent a processor with a specific
memory allocation. Despite this natural affinity, seemingly little research has been per-
sued in the modelling DoS attacks using queuing theory. Most of the research describes
various packet level scenarios with either a single M/M/1 queue or an open Jackson
network, which is a network of M/M/1 queues. Relying on M/M/1 limits what the
user can discern from the framework, as a queue of this type can hold an infinite num-
ber of objects. Given this underlying assumption, all that can be discerned from these
models is the degradation of the queues performance. It doesn’t tell the user at what
point the system being modelled will fail to meet its promise of avaliability. However,
Xiao-Yu et al.[22] does use a M/M/c/K queue to investigate SIP INVITE request
flooding scenario. Their solution is to create a queue that deals only with INVITE re-
quests. Kammas et al.[8] created an open Jackson network of M/M/1 queues to model
virus propagation across a network. Their state space included the internal transitions
of state of each node, as well as the global state of the network. Wang et al.[23] devel-
oped a mathematical model, using embedded two dimensional Markov chains, to allow
the user to generate different probability distributions for any distribution of acceptance
rates. Their model also allows for the separate analysis of the malicious packets prop-
erties from the normal traffic’s.
There has been some research into how DoS attacks will affect SG communication
networks. Hurst et al.[6] developed a mathematical framework to help security practi-
tioners to evaluate the scale of the damage their communication network would suffer
if they were attacked by various types of distributed DoS attacks. Liu et al.[10] demon-
strated that a DoS attack against load frequency controls can affect the stability of the
power grid. Li et al.[9] studied the time delay suffered by critical communication pack-
ets on an IEC 61850 communications network, when either the physical or application
layer is flooded with malicious messages. There seems to have been no other research
into how a DoS attack could be used against the IEC 61850 standard. One potential
solution to this problem is to use flock based behavioural transitions rules to make sure
the packets avoid denying a node availability to the network[24]. Ansilla et al.[1] devel-
oped a hardware based algorithm to deal with SYN flooding on SG networks. Srikantha
& Kundur[18] developed a game theoretic approach to deal with DoS attacks. Their
solution is a system that provides each node in the communication network with a rep-
utation score, which, if a node is compromised, automates the rerouteing process to
exclude that node from the communications topology.
Clock synchronisation protocols are a fertile group of standards investigation of de-
synchronisation attacks. There have been various analyse of the security vulnerabilities
of the Network Time Protocol (NTP)/Precision Time Protocol (PTP) protocols, where
a taxonomy of the various attack vectors against the network show how an andversary
would be able to either manipulate or control the network[7, 4, 11]. Each taxonomy
has proposed various countermeasures, such as introducing the Confidentiality Integrity
Authentication triad into this domain or basing the protocol on the peer-to-peer network
paradigm. Ullmann & Vogler[21] performed an analysis on the consequence of a delay
attack against both the NTP and PTP protocols. They proved that a delay in a sync mes-
sage would affect all the client clocks, and a delayed request message would only affect
the client that sent the message. They proposed implementing a Secure Hash Algorithm
on the protocol to mitigate these attacks. Tsang & Beznosov[20] created a qualitative
taxonomy of attacks against the PTP protocol. They laid out how an adversary could
potentially misuse certain messages in the protocol to create undesirable effects, while
suggesting countermeasures for most of them. Mizrahi[14] developed some game theo-
retic strategies to prevent delay attacks against NTP. Moussa et al.[15] who produced a
detailed analysis of the consequences of a delay attack in a SG substation environment.
They also provided a mathematical model to counter delay attacks.
3 Mathematical Theory of the Framework
The framework uses a network of truncated M/M/1/K queues to create a probabilistic
state exploration methodology for checking the promises of a protocol. The M/M/1/K
provides a more realistic model than the M/M/1 queues because it imposes a limit,
K, on the length of the queue, so when the queue is full it will no longer accept any
packets. This allows the user to model attacks against the availability of a step in a
protocol run. Also, using a network of M/M/1/K provides the user with the versatility
of being able to model different layers of abstraction of the system, as it can be set up to
represent the flow of packets over the communications network as well as the semantics
of a protocol run. When the formalism is used to describe the semantic flow of run each
queue represents an action that a state machine can perform. The framework adapts the
work of Osorio & Bierlaire[16], which describes the state of an individual queue in a
M/M/c/K network, to describe the global state of the network.
The assumptions made by the framework are;
– Each queue obeys the first-in-first-out (FIFO) discipline for processing packets.
– If the queue is blocked, it uses the blocked-at-service discipline.
– The process time and time between successive unblocking are each assumed to
follow an exponential distribution. However, the effective probability distribution
describing the rate at which packets are complete its time with a queue isn’t an
exponential distribution.
– That the transition between states is memoryless.
The rest of the this section is dedicated to describing the mathematical formalism used
by the framework to create models. It first gives a brief overview of continuous time
Markov Chains (CTMC) that are used to find the probabilities of certain events occur-
ring within the network. The next section describes how the physical properties of each
queue in the network are calculated. The state space that is used to generate the transi-
tion rate matrix is described, before, finally, going over the various performance metrics
the framework provides. The below description focuses on the assumptions and set up
for the semantic flow protocol runs.
3.1 Probability for Queuing Theory
As the state of the queuing network is memoryless, the probability of a transition hap-
pening between states can be described using CTMC[5]. To find the vector of the prob-
abilities of the state that the network will be in, the global balance equation must be
solved. The assumptions used in solving this equation are that the system:
– It is independent of time.
– It is independent of the initial state vector.
If the CTMC are ergodic, then an unique steady state probability vector, pi , exists that
is independent of any initial probability vector. This means the global balance for each
state can be described by the conservation of probability flux in and out of the state:
∑
j∈I
pi jq ji = pi j ∑
j∈I
qi j (1)
where pi j is the probability of being in a state, qi j is the rate of transmission between
state i and j, and I is the state space. Rearranging equation (1) it can be represented
in the matrix form:
0 = piQ (2)
where Q is the transition matrix. The steady state vector can be found by solving the
system of linear equations described in (2), using the boundary condition:
∑
i∈I
pii = 1. (3)
3.2 The Mathematical Description of the Topological Space
The first step that the framework must do is to calculate the parameters that govern how
each queue in the network performs. For this framework that is being developed there
are a few built in assumptions that govern how the calculations are performed. Packets
in a queue can be in one of three states, being processed, a, waiting to be processed, w,
or blocked b. For queues in the model’s network a+b≤ c, where the number of servers
of a queue c= 1. The next assumption of the framework is a+b+w≤K, where K is the
maximum capacity of packets in each queue in the network. Another assumption when
using the framework to model a semantic protocol run is that a packet cannot return to
a queue behind it in the network topology. This guarantees that the model doesn’t break
causality as protocols runs are assumed to have unidirectional flow of time built into
them.
Before calculating the endogenous parameters of each queue in the network, the user
must set up a series of exogenous parameters for each node. These are:
– Ki: The maximum capacity of each queue.
– µi: The service rate of each queue
– γi: The external arrival rate to a queue, if it is at the starting edge of the network.
– φ(i,1): The average number of distinct target queues that are blocking a packet
at each queue. If a queue is at the concluding edge of the network this term is not
required. A method for approximating this value is given in Osorio & Bierlaire[16].
– pi j: The probability of packet transitioning from queue i to queue j once processed.
Once these have been set, the rest of the parameters describing the queues behaviour
can be solved by using the following set of non-linear simultaneous equations. The
first equation calculates the probability that a queue is full. It is a standard result for
M/M/1/K queues. The probability that a queue is full is given by:
P(Ni = Ki) =
(1−ρi)ρKii
1−ρKi+1i
(4)
where ρi = λiµe f fi
is the traffic intensity[5]. In the steady state approximation ρ < 1. This
equation calculates the total arrival rate into the queue, including those that are lost:
λi =
λ e f fi
1−P(Ni = Ki) (5)
This is the effective arrival rate of only the packets that are processed by the queue:
λ e f fi = γi(1−P(Ni = Ki))+∑
j
p jiλ e f fj (6)
Pi is the probability that of being blocked at a queue:
Pi =∑
j
pi jP(N j = K j) (7)
The following equation is the approximation that presents the common acceptance rate
of all the queues that a queue can send a packet to:
1
µ˜ai
= ∑
j∈I +
λ e f fj
λ e f fi µ
e f f
j
(8)
The effective service rate of a queue, which includes time being blocked, is given by:
1
µe f fi
=
1
µi
+
Pi
µ˜ai φ(i,1)
(9)
3.3 The Description Probabilistic View of the Protocol Run
Once all of the queue’s parameters have been discerned, a transition rate matrix, Q, can
be generated for the transitions between all the possible states in the state space. Once
that is done pi can be calculated and the marginal probability of an event happening can
be calculated.
Currently the framework allows the user to calculate the most likely path across a pro-
tocol run. The state space for this view is given by.
I = {(k1, ...,kN) ∈ NN} (10)
There are three types transitions that can occur in this state space.
Initial state s New state t Rate qst Conditions
(i, ...) (i+1, ...) λi p0i 6= 0 & Ni ≤ ki−1
(..., i) (..., i−1) µe f fi p0i 6= 0 & Ni ≥ 1
(..., i, ..., j, ...) (..., i−1, ..., j+1, ...) µe f fi pi j 6= 0 & Ni ≥ 1 & N j ≤ ki−1
1. Flow into the network.
2. Flow out of the network.
3. Packet transmission between states.
Q is then used to find the steady state vector for this CTMC.
The marginal probabilities that can be calculated in this view is the likelihood that a
specific queue has k packets. It is calculated by summing the probability of all the
states that have k packets in the queue of interest:
pii(k) = ∑
ki=k∈I
pi(k1, ...,kN) (11)
3.4 Performance Metrics
Below are various performance metrics that can be applied to the marginal probabilities
produced by this mathematical formalism.
Performance Metric Equation
Traffic Intensity ρi = ∑kk=1pii(k)
Throughput λi = ∑kk=1pii(k)µ
e f f
i
Total Throughput λ = ∑Ni=1λ0i
Mean Number of Packets k¯i = ∑kk=1 kpii(k)
Mean Queue Length q¯i = ∑kk=ci(k− ci)pii(k)
Mean Response Time T¯i = k¯iλi
Mean Wait Time W¯i = T¯i− 1µe f fi
Mean Number of visits ei = λiλ
Relative Utilisation xi = eiµe f fi
4 Results
This section describes de-synchronisation attack against the IEC 61850’s control model
that has been discovered using the framework described in section 3.
4.1 De-synchronisation attack
The attack developed using the framework shows that an adversary can cause the client’s
and server’s state machines to become de-synchronised. The adversary achieves this
by either increasing or decreasing the rate at which the server receives the oper−
req[TestOK] in the Select Before Operate (SBO) control model, described in section
19.2.2 of IEC 61850-7-2 (shown in a truncated form in fig. 1). The adversary can cause
this disruption of state because the standard can be interepreted as not requiring the
server to send out a timeout message to the client. Whilst this is happening the client
still thinks the run is following the operation request branch of the protocol run, and will
expect an update that will never arrive. This is a legitimate interpretation of the standard
that devices will have to be prepared for, due to the QoS promise of interoperability of
all devices regardless of manufacturer. This attack vector provides the adversary the
ability to create doubt over the state of any logical node that has “data object instances
of a Controllable common data class and whose ctlModel DataAttribute that is not set
to status-only”[12]. This includes safety equipment, such as circuit breakers, whose
response to an emergency situation have to be completed within 5ms[19]. If the disrup-
tion caused by the de-synchronisation of states causes a control command to violate the
QoS requirements, the adversary can cause physical damage to the distribution network.
The adversary in this result is the same the symbolic one described by Dolev-Yao[3].
The adversary in this model is an omnipotent and omnipresent party on the communica-
tions network who “can intercept messages before they reach their intended destination,
Unselectedstart Receive sel sel test
sel f ail
sel pass
timeout
Receive Oper− req
Send Oper− resp+
Send Oper− resp−
Fig. 1: A truncated version of the server side of the SBO version of the control commu-
nication protocol run described in section 19.2.2 of IEC61850-7-2.
Fig. 2: The graph shows the mean response time a queue dealing with timeout and
receiving the oper−req[TestOK] message as the adversary changes the processing rate
of the oper− req[TestOK].
it can modify and reroute them, possibly with invalid sender fields”.
Fig. 2 shows that adversary can increase the mean response time of the protocol run
receiving the oper− req[TestOK] message by several orders magnitude by altering the
processing rate of queue accepting those packets. The dramatic increase in the response
time to receiving the packets increases the probability that the protocol run will take
the timeout path, which would cause the de-synchronisation. In this analysis no other
variables were altered. The analysis also used the truncated form of the protocol run
depicted in Fig. 1.
5 Conclusion
The above analysis has shown that the explicit QoS requirements of IEC 61850 are not
upheld throughout specification. This has been shown using a framework that allows the
user to look at how specific adversarial interactions with a protocol run can undermine
certain performance metrics in the data stream. The de-synchronisation attack allows
an adversary to cause confusion as to the state of a physical device on the SG’s com-
munication network. This could cause physical damage to the cyber-physical system if
the client’s communications are delayed due to having to reset its state machine, and
begin the protocol again when it is dealing with safety equipment. This attack could be
prevented by having the standard declare that the server broadcast that the session has
timed out, so the client can revert back to the previous known state without having to
query the server to find out what state it is in.
Future versions of the framework will allow for greater resolution in describing this
attack, as it will give the user the ability to calculate the probability that the protocol
run will go down a certain path.
Progressing onwards, the authors plan to further develop the framework by allowing
the user to see the possible internal states of each queue. The two possible views are
a module that allows for the probability of the specific packet ordering to be calcu-
lated, and a module to see whether the packets are blocked, processing, or waiting.
These modules will be added so adversaries with less knowledge and capabilities can
be modelled. They will also add a calculation parameter to the non-linear equations that
calculates the probability that a blocked packet will drop out of the network after a cer-
tain period of time. After this the aim is to develop more performance criteria for other
types of undesirable metrics in the communication network so that more attacks against
the security and QoS promises of IEC 61850 can be discovered in the other communi-
cation models in the standard. Once the development of the framework is complete, the
development of new attacks will be undertaken. The ultimate aim of the authors is to
produce attacks that have a more realistic adversary, one that isn’t omnipresent in the
communications network, and develop a framework in such a way that it can warn SG
managers if they are under attack.
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